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I.

INTRODUCTION

In the world in which we live today, the line between a friend and an enemy has become
blurred. No longer do the good guys wear white hats and the bad guys wear black, and no longer
is there a simple distinction between democratic and communist ideologies. Today's world is
one where it is not the nation state that must concern our national security, but the individual.
The September 11th, 2001 attacks on our nation validate that point of view. Until that
time, we as a nation were caught up in our own illusory dream of invincibility. However, we
were shaken from our dormant sleep to live in the reality that we are not invincible and that a
small group of determined men could shake our nation to its core. This is a reality that the rest
of the world has been living with for years. They know the devastating cost of such a reality. It
is a cost that bears most heavily on the civilians as well as the soldiers. Civilians must come to
understand that the world and their lives must change.
Part of the change began when President Bush signed Military Order 222 on November
13 2001.1 The order authorized military commissions to be utilized for trying non-citizens for
war crimes.2 But the question arises; why limit the use of military commissions to non-citizens?
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Major Timothy C. MacDonnell, Military Commissions and Courts-Martial: A Brief Discussion of the
Constitutional and Jurisdictional Distinctions Between the Two Courts, 2002 Army Law 19,19 (2002)
2
66 Fed. Reg. 222, Nov. 13, 2001. Under Section 2(a) the president limited the jurisdiction of the order to noncitizens.
The term ‘individual subject to this order’ shall mean any individual who is not a United States
citizen with respect to whom I determine from time to time in writing that: (1) There is reason to
believe that such individual, at the relevant times, (I) is or was a member of the organization
known as al Qaida; (ii) has engaged in, aiding or abetted, or conspired to commit, acts of
international terrorism, or acts in preparation therefor, that have caused, threaten to cause, or have
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An enemy is an enemy regardless of their nationality. Black’s Law dictionary defines an enemy
as an antagonist or an opposing military force.3 Should we not use the military to try all our
enemies?
The use of military commissions has a long history in the United States, and it is not
unprecedented to try American citizens in these tribunals. As late as 1950 the United States
employed a military commission to try an American citizen for the murder of her husband, an
Army Officer.4 The use of military commissions against American citizens can be found as early
as the Revolutionary War.5 In 1814, during the War of 1812, General Andrew Jackson used a
commission to try an American newspaperman for espionage.6
Part II of this comment will explore the sources of power to convene a military
commission, the types of military commissions, and the limitations on the use of military
as their aim to cause, injury to or adverse effects on the United States, its citizens, national
security, foreign policy, or economy, or (iii) has knowingly harbored one or more individuals
described in subparagraphs (I) or (ii) of subsection 2 (a)(1) or this order.
Id.
3
BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY,433 (7th ed. 2002). “Enemy. 1. One who opposes or inflicts injury on another; an
antagonist. 2. An opposing military force. 3. A state with which another state is at war.” Id.
4
Madsen v. Kinsell, Warden, 343 U.S. 341, (1952). After the end of World War II the Americans occupied a zone
on Germany along with the British, French, and Russians. During the occupation the American Military used
Military Commissions for dispensing of justice. The jurisdiction of these courts included jurisdiction over American
Citizens in the occupied areas. The Supreme Court of the United States heard a Habeas Corpus petition by an
American woman who had been convicted by a Military Commission while in occupied Germany. She had been
convicted for the murder of her husband, an Army Officer. Id.
5
MacDonnell, supra note 1, at 26
6
MacDonnell, supra note 1, at 27
[G]eneral Andrew Jackson ordered the trial of a non
- citizen at one of the first marital law courts in
the United States. In December of 1814, prior to the Battle of New Orleans, General Jackson
declared a state of marital law in the city of New Orleans. Jackson prepared the city for a siege, an
d to that end, he established curfews and pass policies. individuals found in violation of Jackson’s
curfew or pass police faced arrest. Jackson also ordered military personnel to enter private homes
to commandeer entrenching tools or other supplies he deemed necessary to the war effort. After
wining the Battle of New Orleans, General Jackson maintained the city in a state of Martial law,
despite the retreat of the British forces. Jackson’s actions drew widespread criticism throughout
New Orleans. One of Jackson’s critics was Lois Louaillier, a member of the Louisiana
Legislature. Louaillier wrote an editorial in the local newspaper declaring that the continued state
of martial law was inappropriate and unnecessary. Jackson ordered that Louaillier be arrested and
tried by military commission for a number of offenses, including espionage and inciting mutiny.”
During the trial the commission determined they did not have jurisdiction of Louaillier for six of
the seven charges and acquitted Louaillier for the seventh.
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commissions. In so doing, this comment will examine how commissions have been used
historically and the restraints placed on their use by International law, Domestic law and
Supreme Court precedents. Part III will examine the barriers of trying Americans and argue for
the reversal of the barrier. Part IV of this comment will examine the current cases of American
citizens being detained in connection with terrorist activities. Finally this comment will
conclude with an argument that both enemies foreign and domestic should be tried by military
commissions when detained as an enemy combatant for a terrorist act, acts of belligerency, or
war crimes.
II.

MILITARY COMMISSIONS

A. Power to Convene a Commission
Military Commissions conjure up many images in the minds of Americans. Some think
of the tribunals used at the end of World War II to try former Nazis.7 Others may think of the
tribunals still taking place, such as Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal.8 But for many Americans
these are not the images that come to mind.
Images of secretive trials where men in uniform hand down speedy justice with little
regard to evidence or the rights of the defendant are the more common images Americans have
of military commissions.9 Why else would the idea of trying an American in such a forum be so
repugnant to the common American?10 It is because of the sacred liberties and freedoms that we
deem so important to our way of life that we cannot tolerate an American to be subjected to such

Id.
7
The History Place, World War II, available at http://www.historyplace.com/worldwar2/timeline/nurem.htm last
visited on Oct. 9, 2002. (On file with the TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L.)
8
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia at http://www.un.org/icty/glance/index.htm last visited
on Oct. 9, 2002. (On file with the TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L.)
9
See Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942) 317 U.S. 1, 46
10
See Id.
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a horrid and secretive proceeding.11 Although, it seems we do not mind so much when military
commissions are used against non-citizens. These images are not accurate and should be laid to
rest.
To begin with we ask the question of who has the authority of convening a military
commission. As with any questions over the control of the United States Military the answer lies
in the misty haze between the powers of the Congress and the powers of the President.
Congress’ powers are derived from the United States Constitution Article 1, section 8,
clauses 1, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 16, and 18.12 These powers to raise an Army and a Navy naturally
contain the power to regulate them as well. This power is specifically mentioned in clause 14,
which states, “To make rules for the Government and regulations of the land and naval
forces.”13 This is reinforced by clause 16, which states, “To provide for organizing, arming, and
disciplining, the Militia….”14 One tool commonly recognized for the disciplining of armies by
the international community is that of military commissions.15
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See President wrongly rejects court review of detainees, USA Today, Aug. 22, 2002, at 10A available at
http://www.usatoday.com/usatonline/20020822/4382284s.htm last visited on Oct. 15 2002. (On file with the TULSA
J. COMP. & INT’L L.)
12
Article 1 Section 8 of the United States Constitution is often called the enumerated powers section for the United
States Congress. Here the forefathers listed certain powers that are solely in the domain of the Congress. These
include: “The Congress shall have the power to lay and collect taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts
and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States. U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, cl.1. “To
define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offences against the law of nations. U.S.
CONST. art. I § 8, cl.10. “To declare war, grant letters of Marque and reprisal, and make rules concerning captures on
land and water. U.S. CONST. art., I § 8, cl.11. “To raise and support Armies, but no appropriation of money to that
use shall be for a longer term than two years. U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, cl.12. “To provide and maintain a Navy” U.S.
CONST. art. I § 8, cl.13. “To make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces.” U.S.
CONST. art. I § 8, cl.14. “To provide for calling forth Militia to execute the laws of the union, suppress insurrections
and repel invasions.” U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, cl.15. “To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia,
and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving the States
respectively, the Appointment of the officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline
prescribed by Congress.” U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, cl.16.
13
U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, cl. 14
14
U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, cl. 16
15
MacDonnell, supra note 1 at 20, “Military commissions are a recognized method of trying those who violate the
law of war.” Id.
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The President’s authority to convene a military commission is in the broad powers as
Commander in Chief of the United States Military.16 This power of being a commander has the
inherent power to convene a commission. It is the commander who the commission is most
useful during a time of war to preserve discipline and in expediting that discipline.17 It is also
evident throughout history that it is the commander’s choice to convene a commission.18
Thus the power to convene Military Commissions rests both with the President of the
United States and with the Congress of the United States. It falls within the zone of twilight
Justice Jackson spoke of in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. et al v. Sawyer: “When the President
acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his
own independent powers, but there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have
concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain.”19 This zone is the area where the
President and Congress may have concurrent authority.20 While in this ‘zone’ of powers the
Congress acquiesces to the deeds of the President and this acquiecence occurs over time; the

16

The United States Constitution provides:
The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the
Militia of the several States, when called into the actual service of the United States; he may
require the opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive departments, upon
any subject relating to the duties of their respective offices, and he shall have power to grant
reprieves and pardons for offences against the United States, except in cases of Impeachment.
U.S. CONST. Art. 2, § 2. See also MacDonnell, supra note 1, at 22. “Under customary international law, the right of
a military commander to establish and use military commissions to try suspected war criminals is inherent to his
authority as a commander. By making the President the command of the U.S. military forces, the Constitution vests
the President with that authority generally associated with command, including the authority to create military
commissions. Id.
17
MacDonnell, supra note 1 at 40, “Military Commissions are ‘an important incident to the conduct of war’
whereby a military commander can ‘subject to disciplinary measures those enemies who in their attempt to thwart
or impede our military effort have violated the law of war.’” Id.
18
Id. at 27
19
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. et al v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, at 636 (1952)
20
Id.
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President’s actions may become more permanent.21 In other words, his actions would be
considered constitutional.
On November 13, 2001 President George W. Bush exercised his authority as the
Commander in Chief, as discussed above, and signed Military Order 222.22 In this order that is
directed against non-citizens he authorized the use of military commissions. Section four of the
order states:
Authority of the Secretary of Defense regarding trials of individuals subject to this
order. (a) Any individual subject to this order shall, when tried, be tried by
military commission for any and all offenses triable by military commission that
such individual is alleged to have committed, and may be punished in accordance
with penalties provided under applicable law, including life imprisonment or
death. (b) As a military function and in light of the findings in section 1, including
subsection (f) thereof, the Secretary of Defense shall issue such orders and
regulations, including orders for the appointment of one or more military
commissions, as may be necessary to carry out subsection (a) of this section. 23
21

Id. “Therefore, congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence may sometimes, at least as a practical matter,
enable, if not invite, measures on independent presidential responsibility. In this area, any actual test of power is
likely to depend on the imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables rather than on abstract theories.” Id.
22
66 Fed Reg. 222
23
Id. Section one of this order gave the extensive findings that the President used as justification of the order.
(a) International terrorists, including members of al Quida have carried out attacks on United
States diplomatic and military personnel and facilities abroad and on citizens and property
within the United States on a scale that has created a state of armed conflict that requires the
use of the United States Armed Forces.
(b) In light of grave acts of terrorism and threats of terrorism, including the terrorist attacks on
September 11, 2001, on the headquarters of the United States Department of Defense in the
national capital region, on the World Trade Center in New York, and on civilian aircraft such
as in Pennsylvania, I proclaimed a national emergency on September 14, 2001 (Proc. 7463,
Declaration of National Emergency by Reason of Certain Terrorist Attacks).
(c) Individuals acting alone and in concert involved in international terrorism possess both the
capability and the intention to undertake further terrorist attacks against the United States that,
if not detected and prevented, will cause mass deaths, mass injuries, and massive destruction
of property, and may place at risk the continuity of the operations of the United States
Government.
(d) The ability of the United States to protect the United States and its citizens, and to help its
allies and other cooperating nations protect their nations and their citizens, from such further
terrorist attacks depends in significant part upon using the United States Armed Forces to
Identify terrorists and those who support them, to disrupt their activities, and to eliminate their
ability to conduct or support such attacks.
(e) To protect the United States and its citizens, and for the effective conduct of military
operations and prevention of terrorist attacks, it is necessary for individuals subject to this
order pursuant to section 2 hereof to be detained, and, when tried, to be tried for violations of
the laws of war and other applicable laws by military tribunals.
(f) Given the danger to the safety of the United States and the nature of international terrorism,
and to the extent provided by and under this order, I find consistent with section 836 of title
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B. Types of Military Commissions
Throughout the history of the United States three types of military commissions have
been used: martial law courts, military government courts, and war courts.24 Martial Law courts
are convened during a state of emergency when the local government cannot function properly
and are subservient to military control.25 Military government courts are used when the military
is occupying and/or governing a foreign land such as after World War II.26 War Courts are
courts convened to address specific charges of violations of the laws of war, such as the War
Crimes Tribunals convened after World War II. 27
The Martial Law courts have been used by the United States during most of the wars
conducted on our native soil; such as the War of 1812, 28 and the Civil War29 which both used

10, United States Code, that it is not practicable to apply in military commissions under this
order the principles of law and the rules of evidence generally recognized in the trial of
criminal cases in the United States district courts.
(g) Having fully considered the magnitude of the potential deaths, injuries, and property
destruction that would result from potential acts of terrorism against the United States, and the
probability that such acts will occur, I have determined that an extraordinary emergency exists
for national defense [[Page 57834]] purposes, that this emergency constitutes an urgent and
compelling government interest, and that issuance of this order is necessary to meet the
emergency.
Id.
24
MacDonnell, supra note 1, at 26
25
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, 791 (7th ed. 2002).
Martial Law. 1. The law by which during wartime the army, instead of civil authority governs the
country because of a perceived need for military security of public safety. The military assumes
control purportedly until civil authority can be restored. 2. A body of firm, strictly enforced rules
that are imposed because of a perception by the country’s rulers that civil government had failed,
or might fail, to function. Martial law is usu. Imposed when the rulers foresee an invasion,
insurrection, economic collapse, or other breakdown of the rulers’ social order.
Id.
26
American Bar Association Task Force on Terrorism and the Law Report and Recommendations on Military
Commissions, at 10 (2002) “In Germany, over 1600 persons were tried for war crimes by U.S. Army military
commissions. In the Far East nearly 1000 persons were tried by such commissions.” Id..
27
History Place, supra note 7
28
MacDonnell, supra note 1, at 27.
29
Id. at 28.
The Civil War and the subsequent four years entail the most extensive use of military
commissions in U.S. history. The government conducted of 4,000 military commissions during
the war and 1435 more between 1865 and 1869. These commissions, used in the North and the
South, tried both military personnel and civilians. The charges they heard ranged from crimes
against the laws of war, to acts in violation of President Lincoln’s 24 September 1862
proclamation, to crimes usually cognizable by civil criminal courts. Functioning as war courts,
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marital law courts to try military and civilians.30 These courts are fewer due to the limited battles
fought on American soil and the limited use of Martial Law by the United States government.
Military government Courts have been used during our history primarily after the conflict
had been settled. After the Civil War military commissions were used throughout the
reconstruction period in the south.31 Also, after the end of World War II the United States
employed military commissions during the occupation of Germany.32
However, since the end of World War II, the growing use of military commissions has
been in the War Courts, as evident in the recent use of the Yugoslavia War Tribunal.33 These
courts hear the violation of the Law of War governed by the Hague Convention of 1910.34
Section II of the annex to the Hague Convention outlines the law of hostilities.35 It has
been the violation of these laws; particularly using force against unarmed soldiers; and civilians

martial law courts, and military government courts, receptively, each type of military court was
called a military commission.
Id.
Id. at 28
31
Id.
32
Madsen, at 342
33
Yugoslavia, supra note 8
34
See generally, Convention for the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 1907 U.S.T. LEXIS 29.
35
Hague convention annex, section II provides:
HOSTILITIES CHAPTER I. Means of Injuring the Enemy, Sieges, and Bombardments
ARTICLE 22 The right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited.
ARTICLE 23 In addition to the prohibitions provided by special Conventions, it is especially
forbidden: (a) To employ poison or poisoned weapons; (b) To kill or wound treacherously
individuals belonging to the hostile nation or army; (c) To kill or wound an enemy who, having
laid down his arms, or having no longer means of defence, has surrendered at discretion; (d) To
declare that no quarter will be given; (e) To employ arms, projectiles, or material calculated to
cause unnecessary suffering; (f) To make improper use of a flag of truce, of the national flag, or of
the military insignia and uniform of the enemy, as well as the distinctive badges of the Geneva
Convention; (g) To destroy or seize the enemy's property, unless such destruction or seizure be
imperatively demanded by the necessities of war; (h) To declare abolished, suspended, or
inadmissible in a Court of law the rights and actions of the nationals of the hostile party.
A belligerent is likewise forbidden to compel the nationals of the hostile party to take part in the
operations of war directed against their own country, even if they were in the belligerent's service
before the commencement of the war.
ARTICLE 24 Ruses of war and the employment of measures necessary for obtaining information
about the enemy and the country are considered permissible.
ARTICLE 25 The attack or bombardment, by whatever means, of towns, villages, dwellings, or
buildings which are undefended is prohibited.
30
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that many of the war courts have been convened.36 It is in these War Courts that the trial of
American citizens for war crimes such as the September 11, 2001 attacks can and should take
place. To determine the use of War Courts as the proper venue we must look at the restrictions
placed on the trial of American citizens in military commission by the United States Supreme
Court, Domestic law, and by International Law.
C. Limitations on the Jurisdiction of Military Commissions
1. International Law
International Law plays a role in the establishment and minimal due process procedures
for military commissions; specifically the Geneva Convention III Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War 37and Geneva IV Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War.38 Articles 84, 85, and 102 of Geneva III set out the certain limitations of trying a prisoner
of war.

ARTICLE 26 The officer in command of an attacking force must, before commencing a
bombardment, except in cases of assault, do all in his power to warn the authorities.
ARTICLE 27 In sieges and bombardments all necessary steps must be taken to spare, as far as
possible, buildings dedicated to religion, art, science, or charitable purposes, historic monuments,
hospitals, and places where the sick and wounded are collected, provided they are not being used
at the time for military purposes. It is the duty of the besieged to indicate the presence of such
buildings or places by distinctive and visible signs, which shall be notified to the enemy
beforehand.
ARTICLE 28 The pillage of a town or place, even when taken by assault, is prohibited.
CHAPTER II. Spies ARTICLE 29 A person can only be considered a spy when, acting
clandestinely or on false pretences, he obtains or endeavours to obtain information in the zone of
operations of a belligerent, with the intention of communicating it to the hostile party. Thus,
soldiers not wearing a disguise who have penetrated into the zone of operations of the hostile
army, for the purpose of obtaining information, are not considered spies. Similarly, the following
are not considered spies: Soldiers and civilians, carrying out their mission openly, intrusted with
the delivery of dispatches intended either for their own army or for the enemy's army. To this class
belong likewise persons sent in balloons for the purpose of carrying dispatches and, generally, of
maintaining communications between the different parts of an army or a territory. ARTICLE 30 A
spy taken in the act shall not be punished without previous trial.
ARTICLE 31 A spy who, after rejoining the army to which he belongs, is subsequently captured
by the enemy, is treated as a prisoner of war, and incurs no responsibility for his previous acts of
espionage.
Id. at 31.
36
History Place, supra note 7.
37
See generally, Convention for the Protection of War victims: Prisoners of War, Aug 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316.
38
See generally, Convention on Protection of War Victims: Civilian Persons, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516.
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Article 84 restricts a trial to be conducted by a military court unless the laws of the
detaining power allow for trial by a civilian court.39 The article goes on to speak of providing
impartiality for the prisoner and trying him in and independent court; it states, “In no
circumstances whatever shall a prisoner of war be tried by a court of any kind which does not
offer the essential guarantees of independence and impartiality as generally recognized, and in
particular, the procedure of which does not afford the accused the rights and means of defence
provided for in Article 105.” 40
Article 105 provides the prisoner with a choice of counsel by choosing a fellow prisoner
of war and to call witnesses in his defense.41 The article also provides for an advocate to be
provided for the prisoner if he does not choose a comrade and it sets out time limits for the trial
in order to provide time to prepare for the trial by the defendant. 42
Article 85 of the convention retains the rights codified by the convention for those
prisoners of war tried for acts committed prior to capture.43
Article 102 of the convention provides that a prisoner of war can only be validly
sentenced if he is sentence by the same procedure that tries the Detaining Powers military.44 This

39

Geneva III art. 84, supra note 37, at 64.
Id.
41
Id. art 105, at 76 “The prisoner of war shall be entitled to assistance by one of his prisoner comrades, to defence
by a qualified advocate or counsel of his own choice, to the calling witnesses….” Id.
42
Article 105 provides
Failing a choice by the prisoner of war, the Protecting Power shall find him an advocate or
counsel, and shall have at least one week at its disposal for the purpose. The detaining power shall
deliver to the said Power, on request, a list of persons qualified to present the defence. Failing a
choice of an advocate or counsel by the prisoner of war or the Protecting Power, the Detaining
Power shall appoint a competent advocate or counsel to conduct the defence. The advocate or
counsel conducting the defence on behalf of the prisoner of war shall have at his disposal a period
of two weeks at least before the opening of the trial, as well as the necessary facilities to prepare
the defence of the accused.
Id. art. 105, at 75.
43
Id. art 85, at 64
40

10

article is damaging to the prospect of trying any detainees from the war on terrorism in military
commissions since they are not used to try American soldiers. However, the Bush
Administration has been careful not to designate these detainees as prisoners of war, thus, taking
them out of the protections of this convention.45
As with any international convention these conventions limit their applicability to certain
parties. The conventions apply to armed conflicts between two or more of the contracting
nations, even if a state of war is not recognized by one of them.46 Thus, this limits the
applicability of the Geneva Conventions during the War against Terrorism since there is no
official state that United States is fighting. Also, the Geneva Conventions restrictions are
primarily concerning the treatment and trial of Prisoners of War. The Geneva Conventions limits
Prisoners of War to members of the armed forces of a party to the conflict.47 Again, this denotes

44

Geneva III art. 102, supra note 37, at 74. “A prisoner of war can be validly sentence only if the sentence has been
pronounced by the same courts according to the seam procedure as in the case of members of the armed forces of the
Detaining power….” Id.
45
President, supra note 11.
46
Article 2 provides:
In addition to the provisions which shall be implemented in peace time, the present Convention
shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between
two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of
them. The Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of
a High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets with no armed resistance. Although
one of the powers in conflict may not be a party to the present Convention, the Powers who are
parties thereto shall remain bound by it in their mutual relations. They shall furthermore be bound
by the Convention in relation to the said Power, if the latter accepts and applies the provisions
thereof.
Geneva III art. 2, supra note 37, at 2.
47
Article 4 proscribes who is subject to the convention:
A. Prisoners of war, in the sense of the present Convention, are persons belonging to one of the
following categories, who have fallen into the power of the enemy: (1) Members of the armed
forces of a Party to the conflict, as well as members of militias or volunteer corps forming
part of such armed forces. (2) Members of other militias and members of other volunteer
corps, including those of organized resistance movements, belonging to a Party to the conflict
and operating in or outside their own territory, even if this territory is occupied, provided that
such militias or volunteer corps, including such organized resistance movements, fulfil the
following conditions: (a) that of being commanded by a person responsible for his
subordinates; (b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance; (c) that of
carrying arms openly; (d) that of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and
customs of war.(3) Members of regular armed forces who profess allegiance to a government
or an authority not recognized by the Detaining Power. (4) Persons who accompany the armed
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a member of a nation-state’s military, not an individual involved in a terrorist network claiming
no allegiance to a State. For these reasons the international convention regulating prisoners of
war do not regulate the treatment of terrorist who have been caught and deemed to be unlawful
enemy combatants; therefore, the convention is not a stumbling block to the use of military
commissions against American citizens.
2. Domestic Law
a. Statutory
Congress enacted the Uniform Code of Military Justice to govern its military.48 The code
prescribes who is subject to its jurisdiction of courts-martial in Article 2.49 This personal

forces without actually being members thereof, such as civilian members of military aircraft
crews, war correspondents, supply contractors, members of labour units or of services
responsible for the welfare of the armed forces, provided that they have received authorization
from the armed forces which they accompany, who shall provide them for that purpose with
an identity card similar to the annexed model. (5) Members of crews, including masters, pilots
and apprentices, of the merchant marine and the crews of civil aircraft of the Parties to the
conflict, who do not benefit by more favourable treatment under any other provisions of
international law. (6) Inhabitants of a non-occupied territory, who on the approach of the
enemy spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading forces, without having had time to
form themselves into regular armed units, provided they carry arms openly and respect the
laws and customs of war.
B. The following shall likewise be treated as prisoners of war under the present Convention: (1)
Persons belonging, or having belonged, to the armed forces of the occupied country, if the
occupying Power considers it necessary by reason of such allegiance to intern them, even
though it has originally liberated them while hostilities were going on outside the territory it
occupies, in particular where such persons have made an unsuccessful attempt to rejoin the
armed forces to which they belong and which are engaged in combat, or where they fail to
comply with a summons made to them with a view to internment. (2) The persons belonging
to one of the categories enumerated in the present Article, who have been received by neutral
or non-belligerent Powers on their territory and whom these Powers are required to intern
under international law, without prejudice to any more favourable treatment which these
Powers may choose to give and with the exception of Articles 8, 10, 15, 30, fifth paragraph,
58-67, 92, 126 and, where diplomatic relations exist between the Parties to the conflict and
the neutral or non-belligerent Power concerned, those Articles concerning the Protecting
Power. Where such diplomatic relations exist, the Parties to a conflict on whom these persons
depend shall be allowed to perform towards them the functions of a Protecting Power as
provided in the present Convention, without prejudice to the functions which these Parties
normally exercise in conformity with diplomatic and consular usage and treaties. C. This
Article shall in no way affect the status of medical personnel and chaplains as provided for in
Article 33 of the present Convention.
Geneva III art. 4, supra note 37, at 4
48
Article 1, Uniform Code of Military Justice
49
Article 2, Uniform Code of Military Justice
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jurisdiction ranges from members of the active components, reserve components, retired
personnel, cadets, and prisoners of war.50 But it is clause 10 of subsection (a) of this article that
provides some wiggle room in trying a person by courts-martial. It states, “In time of war,
persons serving with or accompanying an armed force in the field.”51 This language could make
persons who are serving or accompanying an armed forced subject to courts-martial. It does not
limit jurisdiction to a State’s army, only to an “armed force.”52 In the case of the American
Taliban, John Walker Lindh, this clause is very persuasive.53 He was serving with the Al Queda
network, an armed force, or in the alternative at least accompanying them. 54 It follows that he
would then be subject to the jurisdiction of courts-martial under this act.
However, the UCMJ does not claim sole jurisdiction of these people to courts-martial.
Article 21 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice states:
The provisions of this chapter [10 USCS §§ 801 et seq.] conferring jurisdiction
upon courts-martial do not deprive military commissions, provost courts, or other
military tribunals of concurrent jurisdiction with respect to offenders or offenses
that by statute or by the law of war may be tried by military commissions, provost
courts, or other military tribunals.55
This section of the act allows for the retention and use of military commissions over the same
personnel if they are tried under a statute allowing for military commissions or under the law of
war. John Lindh is subject to courts-martial, and if he were to be tried for violations of the laws
of war, would it not be reasonable to try him in a military commission?
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Article 2, UCMJ
Article 2, UCMJ
52
Article 2, UCMJ
53
See Profile: John Walker Lindh, BBC News, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/177955.stm
last visited on Oct. 15 2002 (On file with the TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L.)
54
Id.
55
Article 21, Uniform Code of Military Justice
51
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In sum, the statutory limitations of a military commission are not clear. The Uniform
Code of Military Justice regulates the operations of courts-martial.56 But the UCMJ does leave
room for the use of a military commission. In truth it leaves ‘concurrent’ jurisdiction for the use
of a military commission. 57
b. Mexican-American War Limitations
The first formal limitations of military commissions began appearing during the
Mexican-American War.58 These restrictions on the jurisdiction of the commissions where
placed on the subject matter of the commission. “Offenses tried before a commission must have
been committed: (1) in a theater of war, (2) within the territory controlled by the commander
ordering the trial and (3) during a time of war.”59 The trial also had to be conducted within the
theater of war.60 These restrictions took place during the occupation of parts Mexico during the
war.61 It is arguable that they pertain to the military government and martial law courts alone
since they are more geographically controlled. The boundaries of a military government are
precise as is the order and area to be placed under martial law.62 The violations of the Laws of
War however, are less restricted by this territorial landscape.63 Even if these restrictions to
geography apply to the War Courts the question becomes, what are the boundaries of the “theater
of war.”64 As seen in both World Wars the entire planet was at war, and with the United States’
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Article 1, UCMJ
Article 21, UCMJ
58
MacDonnell, supra note 1, at 28
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
Id. “Lincoln’s proclamation authorized the use of military commissions to try U.S. citizens in areas that were not
in a zone of occupation or under insurrection, and suspended the writ of habeas corpus for anyone confined by
military authorities.” MacDonnell, supra note 1 at 28.
63
The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia is set in the Hague, Netherlands not in Yugoslavia.
Yugoslavia, supra note 8. The war crimes tribunal established the try form Nazis after World War II was made up
from two judges each from the United States, Britain, France, and Russia. History Place, supra note 7
64
MacDonnell, supra note 1, at 28
57
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current War of Terrorism, where the enemy is not from a Nation-State, what constitutes the
theater? To limit it to solely Afghanistan, Iraq, or even the entire Middle East would be naive.
c. The Supreme Court Weighs In
(1). Ex Parte Milligan65
This case arose out of the Civil War and President Lincoln’s suspension of the writ of
habeas corpus.66 Milligan was a citizen of the United States and the state of Indiana.67 He had
lived in Indiana for twenty years and had never been in the Army or the Navy.68 General Alvin
Hovey, commander of the military district of Indiana arrested and confined Milligan.69 He was
tried and convicted by a military commission for various alleged acts, primarily aided the
rebellion.70 Milligan insisted the military commission did not have jurisdiction to try him
because he was a citizen of the United States and not a member of the rebellion.71
The court found his argument persuasive and ruled that a civilian could not be tried by a
military commission while the civilian courts were still open.72 The court believed that martial
law was not necessary in the state of Indiana, stating, “It is difficult to see how the safety of the
country required martial law in Indiana.”73 They also viewed the threat of invasion not sufficient
to justify the use of martial law. 74
In the end, the court gives us one standing principle relating to military commission and
their use for United States citizens; not while the civilian courts are open. In the court’s words,

65

Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2., 107 (1866)
MacDonnell, supra note 1, at 29
67
Milligan, at 107
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
Id. at 108
72
Milligan, at 127
73
Id.
74
Id.
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15

If follows, from what has been said on this subject, that there are occasions when
marital rule can be properly applied. If, in foreign invasion or civil war, the
courts are actually closed, and it is impossible to administer justice according to
law, then on the theatre of active military operations, where war really prevails,
there is a necessity to furnish a substituted [sic] for the civil authority, thus
overthrown, to preserve the safety of the army and society; and as not power is
left but the military it is allowed to govern by martial rule until the laws can have
their free course. As necessity creates the rule, so it limits its duration; for, the
government is continued after the courts are reinstated, it is a gross usurpation of
power. Martial rule can never exist where the courts are open, and in the proper
and unobstructed exercise of their jurisdiction.75
(2). Ex Parte Quirin76
The next case arose from World War II and it involved three German Nationals.77 All of
the Germans had lived in the United States at one point and all returned to Germany between
1933 and 1941.78 All but one was admittedly part of the German Reich.79 The one denying he
was part of the German Reich lived in the United States since the age of five and claimed he was
a United States citizen by naturalization while he was a minor.80 The United States government
claimed he lost his citizenship with adulthood and chose to align himself with the German Reich;
alternatively, the government contended his actions renounced his citizenship.81
After war was declared by the United States on the German Reich the men received
sabotage training near Berlin.82 The men then boarded a submarine on the coast of France and
sailed to the eastern coast of the United States.83 These men wore German uniforms, and were
paid by the German government during their training, and their families were paid while they

75

Id.
Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942) 317 U.S. 1
77
Id. at 20
78
Id.
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
Quirin, at 20
82
Id.
83
Id. at 21
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were in the United States.84 Upon arriving in the United States the men discarded their uniforms
and proceeded their operations as if they were civilians.85 The men were arrested and the
President ordered a military commission to try them for violations of the law of war.86 While
being detained, prior to the judgement of the commission, the men filed a petition of leave for
writ of habeas corpus in federal district court.87 These were denied by the District Court.88
The Supreme Court faced the underlying question of whether a person detained inside the
United States could be tried in a military commission while the civilian courts were still open,
thus violating Milligan.89 To resolve the conflict the court looked at the detainees and determined
they were unlawful combatants and not within the realm of Milligan.90 The court announced,
By universal agreement and practice, the law of war draws a distinction between
the armed forces and the peaceful populations of belligerent nations and also
between those who are lawful and unlawful combatants. Lawful combatants are
subject to capture and detention as prisoners of war by opposing military forces.
Unlawful combatants are likewise subject to capture and detention, but in addition
they are subject to trial and punishment by military tribunals for acts which render
their belligerency unlawful. The spy who secretly and without uniform passes the
military lines of a belligerent in time of war, seeking to gather military
information and communicate it to the enemy, or an enemy combatant who
without uniform comes secretly through the lines for the purpose of waging war
by destruction of life or property, are familiar examples of belligerents who are
generally deemed not to be entitled to the status of prisoners of war, but to be
offenders against the law of war subject to trial and punishment by military
tribunal.91
This distinction between combatant and unlawful combatant hinged on the fact the men
were not in uniform at the time the acts were committed.92 This laid the groundwork for the court
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Quirin, at 22
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Id. at 23
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Milligan, at 127
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to take this case out of the Milligan requirement of civilian courts.93 The court went on to skirt
the issue of outlining the complete boundaries of military tribunals but did find that people
designated as belligerents or enemies are within those boundaries and trial by military
commission was lawful.94
The court also addressed the petitioner's claim that they were entitled to the protections of
the Fifth and Sixth amendments of the United States Constitution; particularly the Fifth
Amendment's requirement of a grand jury95 and the Sixth Amendment's right to trial by a jury.96
The Court rejected these arguments, stating: "We cannot say that Congress in preparing the Fifth
and Sixth Amendments intended to extend trial by jury to the cases of alien or citizen offenders
against the law of war otherwise triable by military commission, while withholding it from
members of our own armed forces charged with infractions of the Articles of War punishable by
death."97 Indeed, this seems the logical conclusion when given the language of the Fifth

Prisoners of war, in the sense of the present Convention, are persons belonging to one of the
following categories, who have fallen into the power of the enemy: (2) Members of other militias
and members of other volunteer corps, including those of organized resistance movements,
belonging to a Party to the conflict and operating in or outside their own territory, even if this
territory is occupied, provided that such militias or volunteer corps, including such organized
resistance movements, fulfil the following conditions: (a) that of being commanded by a person
responsible for his subordinates; (b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a
distance; (c) that of carrying arms openly…
Geneva III art. 4, supra note 37, at 4
93
Milligan, at 127
94
Quirin, at 46
We have no occasion not to define with meticulous care the ultimate boundaries of the jurisdiction
of military tribunals to try persons according to the law of war. It is enough that petitioners here,
upon the conceded facts, were plainly within those boundaries, and were held in good faith for
trial by military commission, charged with being enemies who, with the purpose of destroying war
materials and utilities, entered, or after entry remained in, our territory without uniform-an offense
against the law of war. We hold only that those particular acts constitute an offense against the
law of war which the Constitution authorizes to be tried by military commission.
Id.
95
"No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or
indictment of a Grand Jury." U.S. CONST. amend V. However, the same amendment goes on to limit this right,
stating: "[e]xcept in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War
or public danger;…"Id.
96
U.S. CONST. amend VI. “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial,
by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed…"Id.
97
Quirin, at 44
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amendment, "No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury except in cases arising in the land or naval
forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger…."98
The court concluded its discussion about the amendments by stating, "We conclude that
the Fifth and Sixth Amendments did not restrict whatever authority was conferred by the
Constitution to try offenses against the law of war by military commissions, and that petitioners,
charged with such an offense not required to be tried by jury at common law, were lawfully
placed on trial by the commission without jury."99
(3) In re Yamashita100
This case also arose from the Second World War. The petitioner in this case was the
Commanding General of the Fourteenth Army Group of the Imperial Japanese Army.101 After
the Japanese surrender to the United States he became a prisoner of war.102 Lieutenant General
Wilhelm Styer, Commanding General of the United States Army Forces, Western Pacific
ordered the Judge Advocate General to prepare and serve charges to petitioner for violations of
the law of war.103 After hearing two hundred and eighty-six witnesses and hearing over three
thousand pages of testimony the petitioner was found guilty and sentenced to death by
hanging.104 The petition for habeas corpus set our four claims that the trial was unlawful; (1) the
commission did not have jurisdiction because of hostilities had ceased, (2) the commission failed
to charge petitioner with a violation of the law of war, (3) the commission did not have
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U.S. CONST. amend V.
Quirin, at 45
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In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946)
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jurisdiction because it allowed otherwise inadmissible evidence, and (4) the commission did not
have jurisdiction because it failed to give notice.105
To the first claim the Court relied upon Quirin stating “[T]he Articles of War (10 U.S.C.
§§ 1471-1593) recognized the ‘military commission’ appointed by military command, as it had
previously existed in United States Army practice, as an appropriate tribunal for the trial and
punishment of offenses against the law of war.”106
As to the contention that the commission was unlawful because of a cessation of arms the
Court looked United States history and international practice. The Court reasoned that the
termination of military commissions at the time of cessation of arms was not be practical or
supported by history.107 In their words,
The war power, from which the commission derives its existence, is not limited to
victories in the field, but carries with it the inherent power to guard against the
immediate renewal of the conflict, and to remedy, at least in ways Congress has
recognized, the evils which the military operations have produced. See Stewart v.
Kahn, 11 Wall 493,507.
We cannot say that there is no authority to convene a commission after hostilities
have ended to try violations of the law committed before their cessation, at least
105

Id.

The petitions for habeas corpus set up that the detention of petitioner for the purpose of the trial
was unlawful for reasons which are now urged as showing that the military commission was
without lawful authority or jurisdiction to place petitioner on trial, as follows: (a) That the military
commission which tried and convicted petitioner was not lawfully created, and that no military
commission to try petitioner for violations of the law of war could lawfully be convened after the
cessation of hostilities between the armed forces of the United States and Japan; (b) That the
charge preferred against petitioner fails to charge him with a violation of the law of war; (c) That
the commission was without authority and jurisdiction to try and convict petitioner because the
order governing the procedure of the commission permitted the admission in evidence of
depositions, affidavits and hearsay and opinion evidence, and because the commission's rulings
admitting such evidence were in violation of the 25th and 38th Articles of War (10 U. S. C. §§
1496, 1509) and the Geneva Convention (47 Stat. 2021), and deprived petitioner of a fair trial in
violation of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment; (d) That the commission was without
authority and jurisdiction in the premises because of the failure to give advance notice of
petitioner's trial to the neutral power representing the interests of Japan as a belligerent as required
by Article 60 of the Geneva Convention, 47 Stat. 2021, 2051.
Yamashita, at 6
106
Id. at 7
107
Id. at 12
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until peace has been officially recognized by treaty or proclamation of the
political branch of the Government. In fact, in most instances the practical
administration of the system of military justice under the law of war would fail if
such authority were though to end with the cessation of hostilities. For only after
their cessation could the greater number of offenders and the principal ones be
apprehended and subjected to trial.
No writer on international law appears to have regarded the power of military
tribunals, otherwise competent to try violations of the law of war, as terminating
before the formal state of war has ended. In our own military history there have
been numerous instances in which offenders were tried by military commission
after the cessation of hostilities and before the proclamation of peace, for offenses
against the law of was committed before the cessation of hostilities.108
The second claim of the petitioner, that the charge was not a violation of the law of war
failed because the Court reasoned that as a military commander the petitioner was responsible for
the actions of his subordinates.109 Petitioner was accused of failing to control the men under his
command and allowing those men to commit atrocities against the people of the Philippines.110

108

Id.
Id. at 15 "Hence the law of war presupposes that its violation is to be avoided through the control of the
operations of war by commanders who are to some extent responsible for their subordinates.” Id.
110
Yamashita, at 13
The charge, so far as now relevant, is that petitioner, between October 9, 1944 and September 2,
1945, in the Philippine Islands, 'while commander of the armed forces of Japan at war with the
United States of America and its allies, unlawfully disregarded and failed to discharge his duty as
commander to control the operations of the members of his command, permitting them to commit
brutal atrocities and other high crimes against people of the united States and of its allies and
dependencies, particularly the Philippines; and he …thereby violated the laws of war.
Bills of particulars, filed by the prosecution by order of the commission, allege a series of acts,
on
e hundred and twenty -three in number, committed by members of the forces under petitioner's
command during the period mentioned. The first item specifies the execution of "a deliberate plan
and purpose to massacre and exterminate a large part of the civilian population of Batangas
Province, and to devastate and destroy public, private and religious property therein, as a result of
which more than 25,000 men, women and children, all unarmed noncombatant civilians, were
brutally mistreated and killed, without cause or trial, and entire settlements were devastated and
destroyed wantonly and without military necessity." Other items specify acts of violence, cruelty
and homicide inflicted upon the civilian population and prisoners of war, acts of wholesale pillage
and the wanton destruction of religious monuments. It is not denied that such acts directed against
the civilian population of an occupied country and against prisoners of war are recognized in
international law as violations of the law of war. Articles 4, 28, 46, and 47, Annex to the Fourth
Hague Convention, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 2296, 2303, 2306-7. But it is urged that the charge does
not allege that petitioner has either committed or directed the commission of such acts, and
consequently that no violation is charged as against him. But this overlooks the fact that the gist of
the charge is an unlawful breach of duty by petitioner as an army commander to control the
operations of the members of his command by "permitting them to commit" the extensive and
widespread atrocities specified. The question then is whether the law of war imposes on an army
commander a duty to take such appropriate measures as are within his power to control the troops
109
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The Court looked to the Fourth Hague Convention111 and found it to be controlling as to the
issue of violating the law of war; which, "These provisions plainly imposed on petitioner, who at
the time was military governor of the Philippines, as well as commander of the Japanese forces,
an affirmative duty to take such measures as were within his power and appropriate in the
circumstances to protect prisoners of war and the civilian population."112
The third claim of the petitioner is that the commission allowed evidence that is
otherwise inadmissible under the rules of evidence.113 This claim is based on the 25th and 38th
Articles of War.114 These articles allow for the reading of testimony taken by deposition to be

under his command for the prevention of the specified acts which are violations of the law of war
and which are likely to attend the occupation of hostile territory by an uncontrolled soldiery, and
whether he may be charged with personal responsibility for his failure to take such measures when
violations result. That this was the precise issue to be tried was made clear by the statement of the
prosecution at the opening of the trial.
Id. at 13
111
Id. at 15
This is recognized by the Annex to the Fourth Hague Convention of 1907, respecting the laws and
customs of war on land. Article 1 lays down as a condition which an armed force must fulfill in
order to be accorded the rights of lawful belligerents, that it must be "commanded by a person
responsible for his subordinates." 36 Stat. 2295. Similarly Article 19 of the Tenth Hague
Convention, relating to bombardment by naval vessels, provides that commanders in chief of the
belligerent vessels "must see that the above Articles are properly carried out." 36 Stat. 2389. And
Article 26 of the Geneva Red Cross Convention of 1929, 47 Stat. 2074, 2092, for the amelioration
of the condition of the wounded and sick in armies in the field, makes it "the duty of the
commanders-in-chief of the belligerent armies to provide for the details of execution of the
foregoing articles, [of the convention] as well as for unforeseen cases . . ." And, finally, Article 43
of the Annex of the Fourth Hague Convention, 36 Stat. 2306, requires that the commander of a
force occupying enemy territory, as was petitioner, "shall take all the measures in his power to
restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely
prevented, the laws in force in the country.
Id.
112
Id. at 16
113
Yamashita, at 16
114
Id. at 18, n.5 “A duly authenticated deposition taken upon reasonable notice to the opposite party may be read in
evidence before any military court or commission in any case not capital, or in any proceeding before a court inquiry
or military board,…Provided, That testimony by deposition may be adducted for the defense in capital cases.” Id.
Article 38 provides: “the President may, by regulations, which he may modify from time to tome, prescribe the
procedure, including modes of proof, in cases before courts-martial, courts of inquiry, military commissions, and
other military tribunals, which regulations shall insofar as he shall deem practicable, apply the rules of evidence
generally recognized in the trial of criminal cases in the district courts of the United States: Provided, That nothing
contrary to or inconsistent with these articles shall be prescribed: …” Id. at 18, n.6
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entered into the record as evidence only if it is introduced by the defense in a capital case, 115 and
gives the President of the United States the authority to proscribe the procedures, “including
modes of proof” for military courts.116 The court viewed these articles as not applicable to the
current case or petitioner.117 The court determined that these articles governed courts used
against members of our military not an enemy combatant,118 stating:
We think that neither Article 25 nor Article 38 is applicable to the trial of an
enemy combatant by a military commission for violations of the law of war.
Article 2 of the Articles of War enumerates “the persons … subject to these
articles,” who are denominated, for purposes of the Articles, as “persons subject
to military law.” In general, the person so enumerated are members of our own
Army and of the personnel accompanying the Army. Enemy Combatants are not
included among them.119
The Court further distinguished the current commission from the applicability of the
Articles of War because the commission was a “common-law war court.”120 Based on this
reasoning the Court stated that the Articles of War did not govern a military commission trying
an enemy combatant for violations of the common laws of war. The court stated,
By thus recognizing military commissions in order to preserve their traditional
jurisdiction over enemy combatants unimpaired by the Articles, Congress gave
sanction, as we held in Ex parte Quirin, to any use of the military commission
contemplated by the common law of war. But it did not thereby make subject to
the Articles of War persons other than those defined by Article 2 as being subject
to the Articles, nor did it confer the benefits of the Articles upon such persons.
The Articles recognized but one kind of military commission, not two. But they
sanctioned the use of that one for the trial of two classes of persons, to one of
which the Articles do, and to the other of which they do not, apply in such trials.
Being of this latter class, petitioner cannot claim the benefits of the Articles,
which are applicable only to the members of the other class. Petitioner, an enemy
combatant, is therefore not a person made subject to the Articles of War by
Article 2, and the military commission before which he was tried, though
115
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sanctioned, and its jurisdiction saved, by Article 15, was not convened by virtue
of the Articles of War, but pursuant to the common law of war. It follows that the
Articles of War, including Articles 25 and 38, were not applicable to petitioner's
trial and imposed no restrictions upon the procedure to be followed. The Articles
left the control over the procedure in such a case where it had previously been,
with the military command. 121
Therefore, since this was a trial of an enemy combatant for violations of the common law of war
by a military commission, the court found the power to proscribe the procedure and admissibility
of evidence in the military commander who convened the commission.
The last claim by the petitioner was that the commission failed because of failure to give
proper notice. This claim is based on Article 60 of the Geneva Convention.122 However, in a
long analysis the court determined that the convention only applied to prisoners of war for
offenses committed while a prisoner.123 Thus taking Yamashita out of this realm since he was
121

Id. at 20
Id. at 23
123
Id. As part of the courts analysis for the admission of evidence they looked at Article 63 of the Geneva
Convention and determined it merely applied to Prisoners of War of offenses committed while a prisoner. They
expanded this line of thought to the failure of notice argument, stating:
Petitioner further urges that by virtue of Article 63 of the Geneva Convention of 1929, 47 Stat.
2052, he is entitled to the benefits afforded by the 25th and 38th Articles of War to members of
our own forces. Article 63 provides: "Sentence may be pronounced against a prisoner of war only
by the same courts and according to the same procedure as in the case of persons belonging to the
armed forces of the detaining Power." Since petitioner is a prisoner of war, and as the 25th and
38th Articles of War apply to the trial of any person in our own armed forces, it is said that Article
63 requires them to be applied in the trial of petitioner. But we think examination of Article 63 in
its setting in the Convention plainly shows that it refers to sentence "pronounced against a prisoner
of war" for an offense committed while a prisoner of war, and not for a violation of the law of war
committed while a combatant. Article 63 of the Convention appears in part 3, entitled "Judicial
Suits," of Chapter 3, "Penalties Applicable to Prisoners of War," of § V, "Prisoners' Relations with
the Authorities," one of the sections of Title III, "Captivity." All taken together relate only to the
conduct and control of prisoners of war while in captivity as such. Chapter 1 of § V, Article 42
deals with complaints of prisoners of war because of the conditions of captivity. Chapter 2,
Articles 43 and 44, relates to those of their number chosen by prisoners of war to represent them.
Chapter 3 of § V, Articles 45 through 67, is entitled "Penalties Applicable to Prisoners of War."
Part 1 of that chapter, Articles 45 through 53, indicate what acts of prisoners of war, committed
while prisoners, shall be considered offenses, and defines to some extent the punishment which
the detaining power may impose on account of such offenses. n8 Punishment is of two kinds -"disciplinary" and "judicial," the latter being the more severe. Article 52 requires that leniency be
exercised in deciding whether an offense requires disciplinary or judicial punishment. Part 2 of
Chapter 2 is entitled "Disciplinary Punishments," and further defines the extent of such
punishment, and the mode in which it may be imposed. Part 3, entitled "Judicial Suits," in which
Article 63 is found, describes the procedure by which "judicial" punishment may be imposed. The
122
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being tried for offenses committed prior to becoming a prisoner of war, not for offenses
committed while a prisoner of war.
The Yamashita case held one more important line of reasoning by the Court, the question
of whether or not a verdict by a military commission is reviewable by domestic courts other than
by a writ of habeas corpus. The court found that they are not,
We also emphasized in Ex parte Quirin, as we do here, that on application for
habeas corpus we are not concerned with the guilt or innocence of the petitioners.
We consider here only the lawful power of the commission to try the petitioner
for the offense charged. In the present cases it must be recognized throughout that
the military tribunals which Congress has sanctioned by the Articles of War are
not courts whose rulings and judgments are made subject to review by this Court.
[Citations omitted] They are tribunals whose determinations are reviewable by the
military authorities either as provided in the military orders constituting such
tribunals or as provided by the Articles of War. Congress conferred on the courts
no power to review their determinations save only as it has granted judicial power
"to grant writs of habeas corpus for the purpose of an inquiry into the cause of
restraint of liberty." [Citation omitted]. The courts may inquire whether the
detention complained of is within the authority of those detaining the petitioner. If
the military tribunals have lawful authority to hear, decide and condemn, their
action is not subject to judicial review merely because they have made a wrong
decision on disputed facts. Correction of their errors of decision is not for the
courts but for the military authorities which are alone authorized to review their
decisions. [Citation omitted]124

three parts of Chapter 3, taken together, are thus a comprehensive description of the substantive
offenses which prisoners of war may commit during their imprisonment, of the penalties which
may be imposed on account of such offenses, and of the procedure by which guilt may be
adjudged and sentence pronounced. We think it clear, from the context of these recited provisions,
that part 3, and Article 63, which it contains, apply only to judicial proceedings directed against a
prisoner of war for offenses committed while a prisoner of war. Section V gives no indication that
this part was designed to deal with offenses other than those referred to in parts 1 and 2 of Chapter
3. Effect of failure to give notice of the trial to the protecting power. Article 60 of the Geneva
Convention of July 27, 1929, 47 Stat. 2051, to which the United States and Japan were signatories,
provides that "At the opening of a judicial proceeding directed against a prisoner of war, the
detaining Power shall advise the representative of the protecting Power thereof as soon as
possible, and always before the date set for the opening of the trial." Petitioner relies on the failure
to give the prescribed notice to the protecting power n9 to establish want of authority in the
commission to proceed with the trial. For reasons already stated we conclude that Article 60 of the
Geneva Convention, which appears in part 3, Chapter 3, § V, Title III of the Geneva Convention,
applies only to persons who are subjected to judicial proceedings for offenses committed while
prisoners of war. n10
Yamashita, at 20.
124
Yamashita, at 8
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(4) Madsen v. Kinsella, Warden125
Finally there is the case of Madsen. This case established a precedent of trying American
citizens by military commissions in certain circumstances. Madsen was a citizen of the United
States and wife of a United States Army Officers.126 In 1947 she moved to Germany, then
occupied by the United States, where her husband was stationed.127 In October 1949 she was
arrested and charged with the murder of her husband.128 She was tried and convicted by the
United States Court of the Allied High Commission for Germany, Fourth Judicial District.129 She
was convicted and sentenced to the Federal Reformatory for Women at Alderson, West
Virginia.130 Madsen petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus claiming the military commission did
not have jurisdiction to try her.131 The Federal District court rejected this claim and the Court of
Appeals affirmed.132 The United States Supreme Court accepted the Writ of Certiorari to answer
the question of trying an American citizen by a military commission, or in their words
The principal question here is whether a United States Court of the Allied High
Commission for Germany had jurisdiction, in 1950, to try a civilian citizen of the
United States, who was the dependent wife of a member of the United States
Armed Forces, on a charge of murdering her husband in violation of § 211 of the
German Criminal Code. The homicide occurred in October, 1949, within the
United States Area of Control in Germany. For the reasons hereafter stated, we
hold that such court had that jurisdiction.133
Madsen did not dispute her conviction nor did she contend that a civilian court of the
United States should have tried her.134 She contended that a court martial should have been used
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instead of the commission.135 The court rejected this argument by an analysis of America’s
history using military commissions, and the Articles of war.136 Particular Article 15, which
allows for concurrent jurisdiction, the court stated, “Article 15 thus forestalled precisely the
contention now being made by petitioner.”137
Madsen is important because it shows that under certain circumstances a military
commission may try American citizens. In this case it was simplified by the fact that the United
States was an occupying power of Germany and had established a military government there.
Whether this would necessarily translate to today’s situation of American born citizens being
tried for violations of war is yet to be seen.
(5) Synthesizing the Rules
From these four cases we can ascertain the overriding constitutional principals that
govern the use of military commissions. From Milligan it can said that no United States citizen
can be tried by a military commission while the civilian courts are open.138 But, it can also be
implied that this applies to commissions held in the United States because as we saw in Madsen
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a United States citizen can be tried by commission while residing in an occupied area.139 This
Milligan rule is also limited by historical events such as the trial of Louaillier for allegedly
violating martial law.140 Therefore the rule from Milligan is best stated as no American citizen
shall be tried by a military commission while the civilian courts are open unless the citizen is
residing in a militarily occupied area of the United States or in an area under martial law of the
United States.141
The Quirin case gave us three principles about the use of military commissions.142 First,
there is difference between a prisoner of war and a unlawful combatant.143 The Geneva
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War governs the treatment of prisoners of
war.144 This convention is specific as to who shall be considered a prisoner of war. If a person
does not fall within the definition, then they are some sort of belligerent or unlawful combatant
and are not able to avail themselves of the protections of the convention.145 The court also left
the door open to consider an American citizen as a belligerent and, as such, not immune from
trial by military commission for the violation of the law of war.146 Second, the rule set forth in
Milligan does not apply to non-citizens of the United States.147 Third, the Fifth and Sixth
amendments to the United States Constitution do not apply when using a military commission.148
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In Yamashita the court gave us seven important principles for the use of military
commissions.149 One, the power to convene a military commission is inherent in the power of a
commander.150 Two, the cessation of arms does not affect the commander’s ability to convene a
military commission; if the cessation of arms did block the commander from the use of a military
commission then most of the higher enemy command echelon when be immune from their
use.151 Three, a commander is responsible for the actions of his subordinates and can be held
responsible for their actions.152 Fourth, the President of the United States has inherent power as
commander in chief to proscribe the procedures for the commission even the rules of admissible
evidence.153 This rule could also be expanded to the commander who has convened the
commission.154 Fifth, the court determined the Articles of War did not apply to enemy
combatants in the sense of trial by courts martial.155 The court also determined that the Articles
of War left concurrent jurisdiction over courts martial and military commissions.156 Sixth, The
Geneva Convention did not apply in this case because the court determined it governs only
offenses committed while a prisoner of war; not those committed prior to becoming a prisoner.157
Lastly, the court determined that the judgments of the military are not reviewable by the civilian
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courts, only by the military authorities.158 They determined to give deference to the operations
of the military and the only reviewable aspect of the commission was the detention by writ of
habeas corpus.159 During the habeas corpus hearing the guilt or innocence of the defendant was
not an issue but merely the legality of their detention.160
As already mentioned the Madsen case sets a precedent for the trial of American citizens
by military commissions and shows one exception of the Milligan rule.161 Madsen also
reinforces the idea of concurrent jurisdiction between military commissions and courtsmartial.162
In sum, the Court has given these guidelines for the use of military commissions. One,
commissions cannot try American citizens while the civilian courts are open.163 Two, prisoners
of War are treated differently then unlawful belligerents.164 Three, the Milligan rule does not
apply to non-citizens of the United States.165 Four, the Fifth and Sixth Amendments of the
United States Constitution does not apply to military commissions. 166 Five, the power to
convene a commission resides in the commander.167 Six, cessation of arms does not eliminate the
use of military commissions168 Seven, a military commander is responsible for the actions of
their subordinates.169 Eight, the President of the United States or the convening commander
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proscribes the procedures and rules of the commission.170 Nine, the Uniform Code of Military
Justice (formerly the Articles of War) do not apply to unlawful enemy combatants.171 Ten, the
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War only applies to trials for an
offense committed while a prisoner.172 Eleven, judgements of the commission are only
reviewable by military authorities and the civilian courts only look at the legality of the detention
under a writ of habeas corpus.173
These are the principles that the United States Supreme Court has established for the use
of military commissions. Together with the domestic law of the United States and International
law the use of military commissions is well established. This comment will now turn to the
proposition of trying American citizens for violations of the laws of war by military commissions
and will show why international law, domestic law, and prior Supreme Court precedent support
this procedure.
III.

TRYING AMERICAN CITIZENS BY MILITARY COMMISSIONS

A. The Rule of Milligan and why it should be overruled
The ruling in Milligan is the only true barrier for trying American citizens. Indeed the
subsequent rulings by the Supreme Court have demonstrated a departure from the hard line
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ruling in Milligan,174 and neither the domestic nor international law speaks to forbidding the use
of military commissions against a State’s own citizens.175
The rule in Milligan is simple; military commissions cannot try American citizens while
the civilian courts are open.176 This is first and foremost the highest hurdle to overcome in using
military commissions to try American citizens. This threshold issue is one of life or death, if it
cannot be overcome there is not case for using military commissions to try American citizens.
Yet, this case was decided one hundred and thirty six years ago.177 The question then turns to,
should Milligan be overruled?
The Supreme Court abides by stare decisis,178 and is reluctant to overrule a prior decision.
However, the court has laid out a set of standards to look to when considering overruling a prior
decision in the case of Planned Parenthood v. Casey.179 The court stated:
[W]hen this Court reexamines a prior holding, its judgment is customarily
informed by a series of prudential and pragmatic considerations designed to test
the consistency of overruling a prior decision with the ideal of the rule of law, and
to gauge the respective costs of reaffirming and overruling a prior case. Thus, for
example, we may ask whether the rule has proven to be intolerable simply in
defying practical workability, [Citation omitted] whether the rule is subject to a
kind of reliance that would lend a special hardship to the consequences of
overruling and add inequity to the cost of repudiation, e. g.,[Citation omitted]
174
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whether related principles of law have so far developed as to have left the old rule
no more than a remnant of abandoned doctrine, [Citation omitted] or whether
facts have so changed, or come to be seen so differently, as to have robbed the old
rule of significant application or justification.[Citation omitted]180
In other words the Supreme Court will overrule a prior decision if any of these factors
have occurred. One, if the rule has become unworkable by the lower courts.181 Two, if the laws
and decisions after the case have abandoned the holding.182 Third, if the facts have changed so
much to remove the justification or significance of the rule.183
These guidelines come from a case dealing with substantive due process rights.184 Are
these the same types of rights being dealt with in Milligan? Not in the sense that we now know
substantive due process rights today. Substantive Due Process rights are traditionally derived
from the liberty clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments;185 however, the Fourteenth
Amendment was not adopted until 1868,186 two years after Milligan was decided. The court in
Milligan did look to the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment, stating: “The fifth declares
‘that no person shall be . . .deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.’”187
Therefore, the rights examined in the Milligan case are in the same line of cases concerning
substantive due process rights exposed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment. As such the
criteria for overrule prior decisions set fourth in Casey should be applied.
1. Has the Rule in Milligan become unworkable?
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This criterion is one that is one that is disposed of quickly due to the lack of cases
involving American citizens since the Milligan case.188 Examples of cases since Milligan are the
cases of Quirin, In re Territo, and Madsen.189 However these cases were dealt with quite
differently than Milligan and none of them raise the same issues as Milligan.190 The rule itself
remains in theory workable by the lower courts; however, the Supreme Court has shown that the
rule in Milligan is applied so narrowly and will not apply to American citizens or claims of
American citizenship blindly to make the rule effectively unworkable.191
2. The Court Since Milligan have abandoned the rule of Milligan
The cases following Milligan, which are discussed in section II of this comment, have
shown a steady progression away from Milligan’s central holding. Starting with Quirin the court
opened the door for the distinction between unlawful belligerents and prisoners of war.192 The
court also showed that they would not blindly accepted a defendant’s claim of United States
citizenship.193 The court went further by stating it could be possible for a citizen to lose his or
her citizenship or effectively nullify their citizenship by an act of an unlawful belligerent.194
They based this decision on the act being charged, a violation of the law of war, not on the sole
basis of citizenship.
Citizenship in the United States of an enemy belligerent does not relieve him from
the consequences of a belligerency which is unlawful because in violation of the
law of war. Citizens who associate themselves with the military arm of the
enemy government, and with its aid, guidance and direction enter this country
188
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bent on hostile acts, are enemy belligerents within the meaning of the Hague
Convention and the law of war. [Citation omitted] It is as an enemy belligerent
that petitioner Haupt is charged with entering the United States, and unlawful
belligerency is the graveman of the offense of which he is accuse.195
In a similar case arising from the same war as Quirin, a Mr. Territo claimed his birth in the
United States entitled him to be released from being held as a prisoner of war.196
When the defeated armies of Mussolini began to retreat Mr. Territo threw off his uniform
and began to run to his home.197 He was captured by an American tank patrolled and sent with
50,000 other prisoners of war being held in the United States.198 He was different from his
comrades because he had been born in West Virginia in 1915.199 In 1920 his father took him to
Italy leaving his mother here in the United States.200 His mother did not see him again until 1945
when she was informed he was being held as a prisoner of war only 100 miles from her home.201
She contacted a lawyer and Mr. Territo got his day in court.202
The trial lasted two days.203 The judge ruled that since Mr. Territo entered the United
States as a prisoner of war he would be deported as a prisoner of war.204 The case was appealed
with the Ninth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals affirming the District court, citing that no official
treaty had been signed to end the state of war between the two countries.205 Once again the
courts refused to abide by the Milligan rule or have so narrowly restricted the rule to abandon the
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central holding of Milligan.206 In truth the court relied upon Quirin, for the determination of the
significance of citizenship.207
In Madsen the court relied on the defendant living in an occupied zone of Germany
controlled by the United States, thus availing herself to the military law.208 The question of her
citizenship was undeniable but the status of living in an occupied area where the civilian courts
were closed effectively disqualified her for the Milligan rule.209
The central holding of Milligan is that a military commission shall try no American
citizen while the civilian courts are open.210 Yet, consistently this comment has shown that
claims of citizenship do not save you from trial by military commission for the violations of the
law of war.211
3. American society has changed since Milligan.
Milligan was decided in 1866, over one hundred years ago.212 The American society and
the world have changed dramatically since that time. At the time of Milligan the United States
was still a wilderness country with only thirty-six states.213 Since that time the United States has
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fought six wars,214 emerged from World War II as one of two superpowers, and fought a cold
war.215
The world has become smaller since 1866 with the developments of cars, planes,
computers and the Internet. The resulted globalization has given rise to small groups of people
able to rage terror against giant nations.216 Beginning in the 1970s the world has seen and lived
through the terrorist age. In 1970 five airplanes were hijacked by a group of Palestinians.217 In
1972 terrorists attacked the Israeli delegation to the Munich Olympics.218 In 1979 Iran took
fifty-two American hostages in Tehran; they were not released until 1981.219 In 1983 the U.S.
Embassy in Beirut was bombed.220 In 1988 Pan Am flight 103 was bombed over Lockerbie,
Scotland.221 In 1995 a federal building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma was bombed.222 In 1998
two U.S. Embassies were bombed in Kenya and Tanzania.223 Finally, on September 11, 2001 the
greatest terrorist attack in the United States history occurred when four planes were hijack; two
flown into the twin towers of the World Trade center, one flown into the Pentagon, and one
crashed eighty miles outside Pittsburgh.224

214

Id. The Spanish-American War in 1898, World War I in 1917, World War II in 1941, the Korean War in 1950,
the Vietnam War in 1963, the Persian Gulf War in 1990.
215
Id.
216
See 20th Century History at http://history1900s.about.com/library/time , last visited on Nov. 5 2002. (On file with
the TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L.)
217
Id. at http://history1900s.about.com/library/time/bltime1970.htm last visited on Nov. 5 2002. (On file with the
TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L.)
218
Id.
219
History, supra note 213
220
Century, supra Note 216, at http://history1900s.about.com/library/time/bltime1980.htm last visited on Nov. 5
2002. (On file with the TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L.)
221
Id.
222
Id. at http://history1900s.about.com/library/time/bltime1990.htm last visited on Nov. 5 2002. (On file with the
TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L.)
223
History, supra Note 213
224
2001, Infoplease, available at http://www.infoplease.com/year/2001.html last visited on Nov. 5, 2002. (On file
with the TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L.)

37

Have the facts changed since Milligan; without a question. Today is a very different
world where terrorism is a constant threat and allegiance is not necessarily to your country but to
your ideology.
Following the criteria of Casey225 the argument to overrule Milligan is this. One, the
ruling has become unworkable because of the unclear guidance in which the courts have dealt
with it. The holding has become viewed as so narrow that the same circumstances will never
again appear.226 Two, subsequent holdings from the Supreme Court have consistently strayed
the holding in Milligan.227 The Court now looks to Quirin as controlling.228 Three, the world and
American society is vastly different than that of 1866.
By overruling Milligan and officially eliminating the only barrier to trying American
citizens by military commissions the country and military would be better equipped to wag the
war against terrorism we face today. This comment will not turn to some examples of these
strange days that face the nation.
B. These Strange Days
1. The “Cajun Taliban”
The recent case of Yasser Hamdi is analogous to Quirin and Territo.229 Both cases
concern defendants who were captured committing an overt act against the United States,230
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Hamdi was captured in Afghanistan on the field of battle during American military
operations.231American officials claim he holds dual citizenship of the United States and of the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.232 He was born in Baton Rogue, Louisiana and was taken to his
parent’s homeland of Saudi Arabia when he was still a toddler.233 His birth in Louisiana has
given rise to him being dubbed the “Cajun Taliban.”234
Hamdi was captured in Afghanistan fighting with the Al Queda forces during the prison
revolt at Mazar-I-Sharif.235 He has yet to have his day in court and is being held by the military
with no access to an attorney.236 A case has been filed on his behalf with plans of using the
Territo case a justification to gain Mr. Hamdi’s release to the civilian authorities.237 However,
access to the civilian courts gained nothing for Mr. Territo,238 he was not allowed to stay in the
United States and was treated like every other prisoner of war.239
The Territo case presents little help to Hamdi. In truth these cases have cases generally
rise from a petition for writ of habeas corpus and as we have seen the courts will only rule upon
the legality of the detention not the merits of the case.240 The goal in these habeas petitions is to
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be released into civilian courts were the merits could be decided with more constitutional
safeguards.241
A case has been filed on behalf of Mr. Hamdi by his father as next of friend; Yasser Esam
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld.242 The District court in this case appointed a federal public defender and
ordered him to have access to Mr. Hamdi.243 However the Court of Appeals reversed and
remanded the case for further proceedings.244 The Court of Appeals stressed that the District
court give deference to the executive branch due to the foreign relations aspects, war powers
aspects, and the congressional backing of the actions contested.245 Reasoning that the court has
consistently giving this deference in the foreign relations and war powers arena, stating, “In
accordance with this constitutional text, [Art. I and II] the Supreme Court has shown great
deference to the political branches when called upon to decide cases implicating sensitive
matters of foreign police, national security, or military affairs.”246 This case is still unresolved
but demonstrates how unlikely that these detentions, if truly from national security, intelligence,
or military operations, will be deemed illegal.
2. The “Dirty” Bomber
The case of Jose Padilla is slightly different. He was arrested in the Chicago.247 Mr.
Padilla, an American citizen, was arrested for attempting to construct a radioactive bomb.248 He
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too has yet to have his day in court and has not been given access to an attorney.249 This type of
conduct by the government has brought some criticism.
ABC news interviewed Lawrence Tribe, a professor of constitutional law at Harvard Law
School, who stated “It bothers me that the executive branch is taking the amazing position that,
just on the president’s say so, an American citizen can be picked up not just in Afghanistan but at
O’Hare Airport or on the streets of any city in this country and locked up without access to a
lawyer or court just because the government says he’s connected somehow with the Taliban or al
Queda…”250 However, as in the Yamashita case the court has consistently held that the
procedures for trial and admissibility of evidence rests with the commander.251 In a time of war
the decisions of the commander are vital and the use of commissions and/or detentions of
belligerents reside in him.252
Jan Ting, a professor of law at Temple University, who was also interviewed by ABC
News, gives the counter to Mr. Tribe’s argument.253 He stated, “They [Hamdi and Lindh] should
have been treated like all other enemy belligerents and detained either in Afghanistan, or in U.S.
The reason that we detain these individuals, even without bringing criminal charges, is because
we don’t want them going back out onto the battlefield and committing additional belligerent
acts against us.”254
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In both these cases [Hamdi and Padilla] the defendants have or are trying to gain access
to the Federal District by a writ of habeas corpus.255 By doing so the Courts have consistently
restrained their judgment to the legality of the detention.256 However, with the recent cases of
Hamdi and Padilla even that process may be limited.257 Then when the case of John Walker
Lindh is added it becomes more unclear as to how to handle the cases.258
3. The First “American Taliban”
Lindh was the first American captured fighting for the Taliban.259 However, he was not
taken to Camp X-Ray in Guantanamo Cuba.260 Instead he was flown to Virginia where U.S.
Prosecutors quickly convened a grand jury.261 The grand jury produced an indictment and the
case was set in the federal District Court.262 However, before the case could go to trial, or even
raise any of these issues concerning Mr. Hamdi or Mr. Padilla, Lindh entered into a plea
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agreement and received a twenty-year sentence.263 The question becomes why was Lindh given
his day in court while Mr. Hamdi and Mr. Padilla have not.
Some commentators suggest it was just a matter of time.264 Mr. Lindh was found first
and there was no question as to his citizenship.265 The others were found later with questionable
or weaker links to American citizenship.266 The timing suggests that the later cases were viewed
as “[m]ilitary, suggesting that the government may now view ordinary trials as more trouble than
they are worth.”267
It is unclear why these cases have been treated differently, and perhaps the timing of the
cases do play a role. When the first, Lindh, was captured the country was in shock and involved
in a new war.268 The government was not ready for the unlikely capture of an American and
reacted quickly with the civilian institutions.269 The others were found later when the Bush
Administration seemed more footed for the war they were waging and surer of the powers they
wanted.270 Regardless of the anomaly of Mr. Lindh’s case the argument remains that Americans
can and should be tried by military commissions for violations of the law of war.
IV.

CONCLUSION

In today’s world the line between enemy and friend is unclear. The modern war such as
the one the United States is waging against terrorism is a metamorphic enemy changing with
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every minute. They are groups of people not subservient to any nation.271 In these
circumstances the identity of an enemy is hard to fit into one box. American citizens may well
become involved in such terrorist activities as in the case of John Walker Lindh.272 His
involvement, although he states it was not against Americans, in a war or jihad with the enemy
caused him to take up arms against his own nation.273
Mr. Lindh claimed he was fighting because of the atrocities committed by the Northern
Alliance against women and children.274 He claims he did not join to fight Americans and that he
did not know and does not support Osama bin ladin’s jihad against the United States.275 This
defense of ignorance does not go far considering this was a student of Islam studying in Yemen
and Pakistan for nearly a year prior to his joining Al Queda.276 Osama bin laden openly declared
a Fatwah277 to kill Americans in 1996.278 How could a student of Islam in the Middle East not
know whom Bin laden was fighting?
Mr. Lindh’s adjudication by civilian courts was a mistake. It was a mistake that the
government is not willing to make again in the cases against Mr. Hamdi and Mr. Padilla.279 In
the time of war decisions to use military detention and commission for unlawful combatants rests
271
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solely in the hands of the commanders.280 The only rule against using them to try American
citizens was that of Milligan decided in 1866.281 This rule isan archaic throwback to a simpler
time and culture. The courts have consistently strayed and undermined this rule in their more
recent decisions.282 The governing ruling of Quirin should guide the courts in today’s society
and the question of citizenship should take back seat to the question and acts of belligerency.

283

In all cases following Quirin the court has looked to it as the pinnacle case; not
Milligan.284 Mr. Hamdi, Mr. Padilla, and any other person, American citizen or not, should be
tried by the military for the overt acts of war against the United States that violate the
international law of war. As the Court of Appeals reasoned in Hamdi great deference is
accorded to the political branches of government, especially the executive, dealing with foreign
affairs, national security, and military operations.285
The Bush administrations approach of designating belligerents as enemy combatants286 is
correct and supported by domestic law, international law, and Supreme Court precedent. The
statutes governing the jurisdiction of courts martial and military commissions allow for
‘concurrent’ jurisdictions.287 Customary international law fully supports the commanders ability
to use military commissions.288 The governing precedent of Quirin looks to the act of
belligerency not to citizenship.289 Quirin also held that the Fifth and Sixth amendments do not
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apply to enemy combatants.290 For all these reasons military commissions are a proper venue to
try anyone deemed to be an enemy combatant regardless of their citizenship.
A person who openly takes up arms against the United States or tries to committee some
act of terrorism with links to a terrorist organization deserves the be treated as the “holy warrior”
they believe they are and that is by the military. For soldiers the issue is simple. There is no
distinction between citizenship. Indeed the oath of enlistment makes it clear an enemy is an
enemy:
I, [Name] do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the
Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I
will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; and that I will obey the orders of
the President of the United States and the orders of the officers appointed over
me, according to regulations and the Uniform code of Military Justice. So help
me God.291
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